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Contingency of Funding for Microfinance Organizations

ABSTRACT

Microfinance is a promising tool for addressing the grand challenge of global poverty. Yet, while
many studies have examined how microfinance loans affect poor borrowers, we know little about
how microfinance organizations (MFOs) themselves finance their lending activities. This is an
important oversight because most MFOs do not self-fund their lending, but rather rely on loans
from external funders. To better understand microfinance funding, we apply and extend the
institutional logics perspective to analyze the lending practices of commercial and public
funders, who together provide most of the capital for global microfinance. We argue that these
funders adhere to financial and development logics, respectively, and this leads them to invest in
different types of MFOs. Yet, in the face of uncertainty, we suggest that the practices motivated
by these logics will start to converge in ways that are problematic for a nation’s microfinance
sector. Using a proprietary database of all traceable loans to MFOs from 2004 to 2012, we find
strong support for our hypotheses. Our findings show that the relationship between institutional
logics and organizational practices is contextually contingent, and that this insight contributes
important understanding about the efficacy of microfinance as a poverty-reduction tool.
(196 words)
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Over the past several decades, microfinance has emerged as a globally popular tool to
reduce poverty. By providing small loans, microfinance organizations (MFOs) help to alleviate
financial constraints for the poor and support consumption choices that increase household
welfare and/or provide avenues for future ongoing income (Yunus, 1999). Today, MFOs operate
in almost every nation of the world and collectively account for an estimated US$60-100 billion
in yearly loans (Lahaye, Rizvanolli, & Dashi, 2012; Luminis, 2012).
The ability for microfinance to effectively combat poverty depends, in large part, on its
ability to reach markets where individuals who need capital can obtain it. At its most basic, there
are three key actors in the microfinance industry: borrowers, who apply for and receive loans;
MFOs, which issue loans to borrowers; and funders, which supply capital to MFOs. To date,
most research has focused on the first two. While this has generated useful insight about how
MFOs operate and the effects they have on poor borrowers, we know little about how MFOs
fund their operations. This is an important oversight, as most MFOs are unable to mobilize
deposits to finance their lending and thus require external funds to meet their financial and social
objectives. As such, access to funding is a critical factor in determining the overall health of the
microfinance industry, as well as its efficacy as a poverty-reduction tool.
Research on capital acquisition by profit-seeking firms has found that investors are
attracted to organizations that pose low investment risk and have the potential to generate strong
returns (e.g., Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008). Yet in microfinance it is important that
there are also funders who support sectoral development and social outreach. Reflecting this,
practitioner research has argued that the health and impact of a nation’s microfinance sector rely
on contributions from two main types of funders: commercial funders, which raise private capital
to invest in MFOs; and public funders, which channel governmental funds to MFOs (Reille,
Forster, & Rozas, 2011). Researchers have assumed these funders have different interests and
lending practices, but this has not been subjected to rigorous empirical analysis. Academic
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studies have mostly examined factors that affect the price of funding in a nation (Garmaise &
Natividad, 2013; Tchuigoua, 2014). Practitioner studies have differentiated among funders but
offer conflicting accounts about their lending practices (Gonzalez, 2010; Von Stauffenberg &
Rosas, 2011). Hence, despite expected differences in their objectives, we know little about the
actual lending behavior of different funder types, how their behavior might vary across contexts,
or the effect their behavior has on a nation’s microfinance sector.
To help address these questions, we develop a theoretical approach that applies and
extends insights about institutional logics, which are sets of shared beliefs that rationalize the
value of particular goals and interests (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). In recent years,
logics have become a popular tool for explaining organizational action. This work argues that
logics shape action because they are embedded in the cognition of an organization’s decisionmakers, providing them with a framework that guides attention and helps to discern appropriate
behavior in a given context (Almandoz Rios, 2014). Thus, within the same field or industry,
stable differences are often observed in the practices of organizations that adhere to different
logics (e.g., Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2015). We apply this framework to microfinance
funding to generate baseline predictions about the lending behavior of different types of funders.
Still, we argue that stopping here would provide a partial account, as it overlooks the
possibility that the link between logics and practices is contextually contingent. While most
accept that logics can support a variety of practices, studies to date have focused on idiosyncratic
behavioral shifts that result from learning, random drift, or strategic deviation within a given
context (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). Yet we know that firms often
operate in multiple environments (Vasudeva, Zaheer, & Hernandez, 2013) and that practices can
shift in response to local contingencies (Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005). Extending this, we
suggest that firms that adhere to a particular logic may behave in systematically different ways in
different contexts. To this end, our argument connects the logics perspective with research on
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how organizations respond to uncertainty in their external environment. Uncertainty disrupts the
link between an organization’s actions and expected outcomes, creating an impetus for strategic
change (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009). We suggest that
because logics shape how decision-makers perceive and respond to the environment, attention
will shift in response to uncertainty leading to behavioral changes that are guided by a firm’s
orienting logic. In short, the practices seen as appropriate for pursuing a given set of interests
may differ in placid versus uncertain contexts. This is germane to our study, as microfinance
funders—like many organizations that work to address social challenges—operate in nations
where there are varying levels of political and economic uncertainty (Marquis & Raynard, 2015).
To apply our theory, we first distinguish between commercial and public funders as the
main capital providers in global microfinance. Based on the practitioner literature, as well as
interviews with over 30 industry informants, we discern the logics that these funders adhere to
and use this to make predictions about their lending behavior. We argue that commercial funders
adhere to a financial logic that emphasizes investment return and supports a focus on large,
financially strong MFOs. By comparison, public funders adhere to a development logic that
prioritizes the health and efficacy of a nation’s microfinance sector and thus favors small, notyet-sustainable MFOs that do not appeal to commercial funders (Griffith & Evans, 2012).
As a nation becomes more uncertain, we predict that commercial funders will place more
emphasis on MFO size and less on financial performance: large MFOs are likely to be viewed as
stable and thus more likely to provide the funder with its desired financial return. However, past
performance has less predictive power in such contexts, making it a less-reliable investment risk
indicator (Davis et al., 2009). We also predict MFO size will become important to public funders
as uncertainty rises. These funders rely on capital recovery to sustain their development efforts;
if an MFO defaults on its loans, funders have less money to invest in subsequent projects
(Griffith & Evans, 2012). Moreover, if an MFO becomes insolvent, it does not contribute to a
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healthy microfinance sector. Thus, from the funder’s perspective, lending to large MFOs is a
pragmatic way to support sector development under uncertainty. We thus expect the lending
practices of commercial and public funders to converge as uncertainty rises, even as the two are
guided by different logics. Given that the need for microfinance rises when a nation becomes
volatile and that sector growth and outreach are constrained when funding clusters in large
MFOs (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011; Wiesner & Quien, 2010), our arguments expose a
challenge for global microfinance with potential implications for millions of poor borrowers.
We test our arguments using a proprietary database of all traceable loans made between
funders and MFOs from 2004 to 2012. We model the amount and type of funding received by
each MFO each year and use country-fixed effects to isolate the effect of changing uncertainty.
Our results, along with numerous robustness checks and supplementary analyses, provide strong
support for our predictions. Our approach contributes understanding about the link between
institutional logics and organizational practices by showing that, while logics shape action, the
outcomes this yields may differ in systematic ways as the environment changes. By applying this
argument, we also show the contextual nature of microfinance funding and generate a number of
practical insights that may help increase the efficacy of microfinance as a poverty-reduction tool.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Microfinance Funding and Poverty Reduction
Banks face high transaction costs when making and monitoring small loans; as a result,
the poor are generally excluded from the formal financial system. This increases exposure to
financial uncertainty, makes it difficult to start businesses, and forces the poor to rely on
exploitative local lenders—all of which contribute to enduring poverty (Ledgerwood, Earne, &
Nelson, 2013). Originally, microfinance worked to address the exclusion problem by providing
small loans designed to help the poor start and grow micro-enterprises. The rationale was that
operating revenue from these businesses could be used to repay the loan, while also creating an
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ongoing source of sustainable income. The sector has since developed a less-restrictive lending
focus and now provides a more expanded set of services to the poor (Ledgerwood et al., 2013).
Not surprisingly, there has been considerable scholarly attention examining the impacts
of microfinance, with a number of studies highlighting its positive effects. There is evidence that
loans help the poor to absorb unforeseen expenses and foster a long-term orientation in their
consumption decisions (Karlan & Zinman, 2010). Per the sector’s original focus, studies have
also shown that microfinance supports the creation and growth of small businesses. While there
is variance in the success of these ventures, the net effect is typically a contribution to household
income (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2015). Microfinance also delivers benefits by
focusing on women borrowers. On average, women dedicate a larger portion of loan proceeds to
health and education expenses, both of which contribute to poverty reduction (Angelucci,
Karlan, & Zinman, 2012). For unmarried women, loans also provide an avenue for economic
participation outside of the informal or illegal economy (Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012).1
While it is important to understand how microfinance affects borrowers, the question of
how MFOs finance their lending activities has been largely overlooked. This omission is
important because, whereas banks finance their lending through deposits, most MFOs cannot
accept deposits and thus depend on external funders for the capital required to make loans and
grow their operations (Morduch, 2000). In total, MFOs receive about US$30 billion per year in
funding, mostly from interest-bearing loans.2 Although the relative breakdown varies by region,
it is estimated that about 80 percent of this funding reaches poor borrowers (Lahaye et al., 2012).
Thus, for most MFOs, lending capacity is a direct function of external capital received.
In addition to organization-level implications, the overall health and impact of a nation’s
microfinance sector are determined, in part, by how funds are allocated among MFOs. It is
1

Importantly, there are several studies highlighting concerns and challenges associated with microfinance. For
example, see Battilana & Dorado (2010), Karim (2011), Polgreen & Bajaj (2010), and Viada & Gaul (2012).
2
Estimates suggest that the overall value of debt financing in microfinance outpaces other instruments, such as
grants and equity, by a ratio of about five to one (Lahaye, Rizvanolli, & Dashi, 2012).
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important that each nation’s sector comprises many well-functioning and socially committed
MFOs, as this leads to greater loan volumes, higher overall outreach levels, and competition that
promotes better service and lower interest rates (e.g., Lützenkirchen, Weistroffer, & Speyer,
2012). For this to happen, though, funding needs to be available not just to large, financially
sustainable MFOs but also to those that are small, highly committed to social outreach, not yet
self-sustaining, and more likely to default on their loans (Reille et al., 2011; Wiesner & Quien,
2010). Accomplishing this goal therefore necessitates the existence of funders that are willing to
accept more risk in their investments in order to meet these development objectives.
To date, however, there has been little research examining the lending practices of
different types of microfinance funders. A handful of academic studies have examined the
overall price of financing in a country, irrespective of lender differences. This work has found
that MFOs pay less interest when their nation has strong market-supporting institutions
(Tchuigoua, 2014) and when loans come from nations that are politically similar to their own
(Garmaise & Natividad, 2013). By comparison, practitioner research has differentiated between
funders, identifying two main types: commercial and public. Yet this work casts doubt as to
whether the two lend to different types of MFOs (Gonzalez, 2010; Von Stauffenberg & Rosas,
2011). Thus, while a strong microfinance sector requires that capital be available to support
diverse MFOs, we have little insight into the practices of different funders or the conditions
under which their behavior creates a healthy funding ecology in a nation. We argue that an
approach based in institutional logics can help advance insight here, as it directs attention to the
sources of rationality that underpin an organization’s interests, and thus provides leverage for
theorizing about the aims of different funders as well as the MFO attributes that they attend to
and value when making investment decisions (Thornton et al., 2012).
An Institutional Logics Approach to Microfinance Funding
The institutional logics perspective focuses on explaining how organizational action is
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shaped by shared sets of beliefs—or cultural influences—that rationalize the value of particular
interests and identities (Thornton et al., 2012). As with other neo-institutional approaches,
studies have shown that logics create expectations for how an organization should appropriately
act within a given context and work through a variety of external channels to promote aligned
action (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013). A unique feature of the logics approach, though, is the
recognition that logics are also internalized by organization members and thus affect how
managers allocate their attention, interpret external stimuli, and make decisions (Thornton &
Ocasio, 1999). As scholars increasingly come to recognize that organizations face institutionally
complex environments that comprise conflicting external demands, the link between logics and
managerial cognition has taken on heightened importance for understanding organizational
behavior (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury,
2011; Wry & York, 2015; Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, & Miller, 2016). In this regard, there is
evidence that logics affect which external influences a firm attends and responds to (Pache &
Santos, 2013), while also guiding its action across diverse institutional contexts (Vasudeva et al.,
2013). In short, scholars have posited a close and mutually constitutive link between logics and
action, where a firm’s internal operations and external practices are traced to “logic-consistent
decisions that reinforce extant…identities and strategies” (Lounsbury, 2007: 289).
Notably for our purposes, there is also evidence that different types of organizations
within a field or industry may adhere to different logics, and behave in consistently different
ways as a result. Providing evidence of this, Rao and colleagues (2003) found that French
restaurants differed with regard to cooking practices, ingredients, and dishes produced depending
on whether they adhered to the logic of classical or nouvelle cuisine. Similar patterns have been
found among investment firms. For example, Lounsbury (2007) found that the strategies of
different mutual funds were anchored in either professional or trustee logic: the former used
active money management practices, while the latter focused on long-term investing. There is
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also evidence that banks that operate according to community logic are more likely than national
banks to lend to local businesses and prioritize local relationships (Almandoz Rios, 2014;
Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). Pahnke and colleagues (2015) showed that venture capitalists,
corporate investors, and government agencies each function according to a unique logic that
leads to practices that variously enable or constrain innovation among fund recipients.
While these studies show that logics can shape investment practices, in each case funders
are investing in commercial businesses with the aim of generating financial returns. Yet, in
contexts like ours, where organizations seek financial and social returns (see also Battilana &
Lee, 2014), it is important to consider the varying, and nonpecuniary, motives that different
funders might have. We thus build on existing work by drawing on the microfinance literature,
as well as interviews with over 30 industry informants, to discern the logics that motivate
different microfinance funders and use this to make predictions about their investment behavior.
We began by interviewing funders with whom we had preexisting relationships, and asked each
to introduce us to others that they knew. Next, we identified contacts for the remaining funders in
our database and sent each an interview invitation. Overall, this yielded 34 interviews, conducted
either online or by phone, 19 of which were with commercial funders. Table 1 summarizes each
lender type, including information on subtypes and the scale of funding provided. As with
previous studies, (e.g., Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011), our research focuses on commercial
and public funders because they account for the large majority (97%) of microfinance funding.3
-----Insert Table 1 about here----Commercial Funders and Financial Logic
Commercial funders are primarily investment funds and private equities that raise money
from private investors to lend to MFOs; traditional banks that lend to MFOs are also included in
this category. While there are local commercial funders in most nations, the majority—funds and
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We also analyzed lending practices for charitable funders (see https://mfifunding.wordpress.com).
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private equities in particular—are based in the United States or Western Europe (Sapundzhieva,
2011). After performing local due-diligence, most funding decisions are made by an investment
committee at the funder’s head office (Gonzalez, 2010). As a category, commercial funders are
the largest and fastest-growing capital source in global microfinance (Lahaye et al., 2012).
Commercial funders’ basis of interest. The interests of commercial funders are guided
by a financial logic that prioritizes investment return. This is obvious for banks, which base their
lending decisions on an analysis of borrower repayment capacity. Investment funds and private
equities may also aspire to “do good” with their investments but, as with banks, lending
decisions follow a financial calculus (Lützenkirchen et al., 2012). For most, social returns come
simply from investing in microfinance, while others apply a set of screens to ensure money is not
going to MFOs with usurious lending practices (Glisovic & Moretto, 2012). In either case, once
a consideration set of potential investment targets has been cultivated, the aim is to achieve
market or near-market returns that generate revenue for the funder and entice people to invest in
their products. For instance, BlueOrchard (2015), a microfinance investment fund, advertises that
it helps “investors obtain strong financial returns while contributing to financial inclusion in
emerging economies.” Describing in more detail what this means from the funder perspective,
many of our interviewees gave candid explanations for why financial returns are crucial. Per one
fund manager, “[We’re] like any other commercial lender; if we lose people’s money or miss the
return we’re promising, there’s no way we’ll be able to raise another fund.” Said another, “We
need returns to capital and need to make sure we’re involved with [MFOs] who can ensure
this…it’s a pure investment case driving our decisions.” Covering the entire investment process,
a private equity manager told us “We start by applying screens...once we’ve got the initial
consideration set put together, we need to [look] for the best bets.”
Commercial funders’ basis of action. Microfinance funders face the risk that an MFO
(i.e., borrower) will not be able to fulfill the obligations of the loan agreement. Thus, given their
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interests, it is reasonable to expect that commercial funders will focus their attention on MFOs
that pose the least risk of defaulting on their loans (Gonzalez, 2010). As in other investment
contexts, there is evidence that size and financial performance are core indicators of an MFO’s
default risk (Berk, 1995; Fama & French, 2012; Petersen & Rajan, 1994).4
Size acts as a proxy for a number of hard-to-observe risk factors. Studies routinely find
that large firms have less-volatile performance (Berk, 1995). Larger firms are also thought to be
more legitimate (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), of higher status (Haveman, 1993), and endowed
with a greater amount of slack resources (George, 2005). Size is also a visible indicator that is
easy to compare across organizations and gives evidence of past success and future stability
(Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010). As such, it is commonly linked to organizational stability and
performance (see Josefy, Kuban, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015). In microfinance, large MFOs are also
more likely to be integrated into a nation’s banking sector, which helps to buffer against liquidity
concerns (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009; Reille & Forster, 2008).
By comparison, financial performance is a direct indicator of a firm’s solvency and a
strong proxy of its ability to repay loans (Fama & French, 2012). Studies suggest that
performance is closely attended to by organizational decision-makers, who are generally more
interested in partnering with and investing in firms that have strong versus weak performance (Li
& Rowley, 2002; Wry, Lounsbury, & Jennings, 2014). Furthermore, and germane to our context,
the influence of financial performance in such decisions appears to be particularly strong in
emerging markets (Geringer, 1991; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000).
Reflecting this, the practitioner literature suggests that microfinance funders rely heavily
on size and financial performance to assess an MFO’s riskiness (Mersland & Strom, 2010;
4

Though it is common for individuals to use the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” interchangeably, some scholars have
attempted to differentiate the two constructs. Following Knight (1921)—and consistent with the language used by
the funders we spoke with—we treat risk as a condition in which an actor can assign probabilities to potential
outcomes. In our context, the primary risk confronting funders is the probability that an MFO will be unable to pay
back the loan and thus defaults. Conversely, uncertainty is a condition in which outcomes are unknowable and thus
outcome probabilities cannot be assigned a priori (Knight, 1921; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Based on this
distinction, in our case uncertainty tends to exacerbate the investment risks faced by microfinance funders.
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MicroRate, 2013).5 As a fund manager told us, “We like big and stable MFOs…ones that are the
key players in their market.” Another fund manager remarked, “[I invest in] big MFOs [because
they] are more likely to have experience, successful business models, and an established
customer base.” Each commercial funder we spoke to also reported looking closely at an MFO’s
financial position before investing. Stated plainly by a private equity manager, this meant that
“for us to even look at you, you need to be clearly beating the market,” while another reported
that “we like [MFOs] with a good loan book and sound fundamentals because they’re the most
likely to get our money back to us.” Based on these considerations, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 1. Within a country, the (a) size and (b) financial performance of an MFO is
positively associated with the amount of loans it receives from commercial funders.
Public Funders and Development Logic
Public funders include government departments and aid agencies, as well as development
finance institutions (DFIs). These funders are typically seeded with an endowment from one or
more national governments, from which they offer subsidized loans to ventures deemed too risky
for commercial investors (Griffith & Evans, 2012). Public funders may be local or foreign and,
as with commercial funders, investment decisions are typically centralized in the organization’s
head office (Gonzalez, 2010; Hoffman, 1998). These funders were among the first to invest in
microfinance and remain a key capital source (Lafourcade, Isern, Mwangi, & Brown, 2006).
Public funders’ basis of interest. Public funders operate according to a development
logic, where the primary aim is to support the health and social impact of a nation’s microfinance
sector (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011). To this end, they are interested in fostering the growth
and sustainability of target organizations, thus contributing to the emergence of more healthy
MFOs in a nation and the increased competition and social outreach this brings (Otero & Rhyne,
1994). Revenue from these loans is reinvested to support the funder’s ongoing development
5

Some research in microfinance has identified a third factor that can be used to assess MFO riskiness: transparency,
which reflects the quality of an organization’s financial reporting. Because we have no a priori expectation that
funders will differ in their preference for MFO transparency, we only hypothesize relationships between size and
financial performance on the one hand and funder type on the other. We control for transparency in our analyses.
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efforts (Griffith & Evans, 2012). Hence, though loans are made on a cost-recovery basis, public
funders are not financially motivated in the same way as commercial funders. Capturing this
well, Goodman (2007: 21) notes that “[public funders] make capital available to [MFOs] through
sustainable mechanisms to support their development and growth…typical financial targets [are]
to maintain the original capital invested.” This was echoed by our interviewees, such as one DFI
officer who reported that, “The whole investment process is different than for commercial
funders…[we look] to fund growth and capacity building.” Offering further insight into the
importance of these aims, another interviewee asserted, “We’re a mission-driven organization
and this means [we’re] interested in developing the sector and…supporting poverty alleviation.”
Public funders’ basis of action. To pursue their development aims, public funders
espouse a lending focus that targets MFOs that would not be deemed creditworthy by
commercial lenders. Whereas commercial funders are likely to invest in large, financially strong
MFOs, public funders focus their attention on supporting those that are small and not yet selfsustaining (Griffith & Evans, 2012; Reille et al., 2011). The rationale is that lending to these
MFOs can help them to expand operations and develop their internal capacities to the level
where they are able to access commercial capital. Once this is accomplished, public funders
move on and invest in the next round of emerging MFOs, furthering the development of a
nation’s microfinance sector (Otero & Rhyne, 1994). As a government official told us,
[Public funders] are the first ones into [an MFO]. We help to build capacity and are
willing to take risks that others won’t. By focusing on emerging [MFOs], we play a
healthy role in building up the entire sector and fostering development.
Both the microfinance literature and our interview data thus point to a negative
relationship between an MFO’s size and financial performance and the amount of public funding
it receives. While some have suggested that this pattern may not materialize in practice—and
that public and commercial funders compete to invest in the same MFOs (e.g., Abrams & Von
Stauffenberg, 2007)—evidence for these claims is based on limited data and has not been
subjected to empirical testing. As such, we predict the following:
13

Hypothesis 2. Within a country, the (a) size and (b) financial performance of an MFO is
negatively associated with the amount of loans it receives from public funders.
Environmental Uncertainty and the Shifting Relationship between Logics and Action
Our arguments thus far reflect a fairly faithful application of the logics perspective.
However, this theoretical approach is limited in that it does not consider that firms which adhere
to a logic may behave in different ways under different environmental conditions. Indeed,
although we know that firms often operate in multiple jurisdictions, research on logics and
practice change has focused on understanding temporal shifts within specific contexts. For
instance, studies have shown that organizations may adhere to a logic but alter their behavior
subtly over time due to learning (Feldman & Pentland, 2003), drift (Clemens & Cook, 1999), or
mindful deviation (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). These shifts are idiosyncratic, though, and
unlikely to generate systemic practice changes unless successfully theorized as rational and
appropriate in relation to a logic (Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016; Reay, Goodrick, Waldorff, &
Casebeer, 2016; Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012). Another mechanism that may lead to
systemic practice change is replacement of a field’s dominant logic. Typically, this is a slow and
conflict laden process through which challengers mobilize to shift the prevailing understandings
about what is appropriate and desirable in a field (York, Hargrave, & Pacheco, 2015). When
successful, this creates pressure for firms to conform to new behavioral expectations (Haveman
& Rao, 1997; Rao et al., 2003). These pressures may also motivate a firm to replace managers
with people who adhere to the new logic and its associated practices (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
While it is useful to understand how organizational behavior patterns can shift as the
practices associated with a logic change, or a new logic ascends within a field, cross-sectional
contextual contingency is arguably just as important in settings like ours where funders are active
across diverse nations. Indeed, there is a growing recognition in the literature that the practices
associated with a logic may be variously effective in different contexts (Vasudeva et al., 2013).
Studies have also shown that as practices diffuse, local firms often alter them in patterned ways
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to increase their fit with the local environment (Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005). Taken together,
this work suggests that firms may be motivated to alter their behavior in response to contextual
contingencies and that, within a given context, such behavioral shifts may be patterned rather
than idiosyncratic. While this work has not considered that firms which adhere to a logic might
behave differently in different contexts, we suggest this extension can be made by linking the
logics perspective to research on environmental uncertainty.
Whereas institutional scholars have focused on how firms respond to changing notions of
appropriate behavior (e.g., Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), studies of uncertainty examine how firms
react when the environment changes in unpredictable ways (Child, 1972; Thompson, 1967). This
work suggests that uncertainty disrupts the link between a firm’s actions and expected outcomes,
casting doubt on the efficacy of previous strategies (Audia et al., 2000). Resource providers may
also have trouble with inferences about a partner’s future performance in such situations because
cause and effect become difficult to disentangle (Davis et al., 2009; Haunschild & Miner, 1997).
These factors create an impetus for firms to change their behavior in an attempt to deal with the
specific uncertainty being faced (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). As logics function as the lens through which decision-makers perceive and respond to
external stimuli (Almandoz Rios, 2014), we expect that firms will alter their behavior in response
to uncertainty and do so in ways they consider appropriate in relation to their orienting logic.
In microfinance, this means that how different types of funders go about pursuing their
interests may differ based on the level of uncertainty in the nations where they operate. Because
most MFOs are located in developing nations where there are varying levels of political and
financial uncertainty, this is an important issue (Ault & Spicer, 2014; Mair et al., 2012). We
argue that the practices deemed appropriate according to both financial and development logics
will shift as these two types of uncertainty increase, affecting the MFO attributes that a funder
attends to and values when extending loans.

15

Political uncertainty. Countries have their own specific rules and regulations with regard
to investments. These rules, and a nation’s political environment more broadly, are the outcome
of a negotiated process whereby various interest groups negotiate, lobby, and otherwise seek to
influence policymakers. The degree of uncertainty in this process is largely a function of the
formal policymaking structure, which, in emerging economies, often lacks the requisite checks
and balances to achieve political stability (Henisz & Delios, 2004). Political uncertainty thus
reflects the possibility that political decisions or events in a country will affect the behavior or
ownership of organizations in ways that negatively affect investment returns (Howell, 2001).
There are two interrelated features of political uncertainty in a country that are germane
to capital funders. The first is the quality of the political-institutional infrastructure necessary to
facilitate business transactions. For example, regulations around property rights and contract
enforcement provide assurances that asset ownership is respected by the law and that legal
mechanisms are in place to ensure that contractual obligations are met. The second factor is a
government’s ability and willingness to change these regulations. For example, the ability of a
faction to impose radical changes in a nation’s political environment is limited by the presence of
an impartial judiciary, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality. The absence of
religious and military leaders from politics, lower levels of religious and ethnic tensions, and
minimal levels of armed conflict are also related to political stability (Ramady, 2014). These
conditions provide businesses with greater assurance that potentially harmful policies must pass
through a process of checks and balances and build investor confidence by ensuring that the
“rules of the game” in a nation are unlikely to change capriciously (Henisz, 2000; Li, 2009).
Financial uncertainty. In addition to political uncertainty, there is also uncertainty
associated with a country’s ability to finance its sovereign, commercial, and trade obligations.
For example, as the amount of foreign debt increases relative to the size of the economy, a
country’s ability to repay its debts declines (Soussanov, 2002). When this happens, a nation is
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more apt to face financial crises such as recession and/or interest rate spikes (Arellano, 2008).
Loan defaults are also often accompanied by exchange-rate instability, currency devaluations,
and inflation, each of which has been shown to deter investment (Allayannis & Weston, 2001;
Geczy, Minton, & Schrand, 1997). Supporting this, research has shown a link between financial
stability and the investment returns achieved by foreign subsidiaries in a country (Click, 2005),
as well as the future expected returns of domestic firms (Erb, Campbell, & Viskanta, 1996).
Commercial Funders and Financial Logic under Uncertainty
Although commercial funders will likely demur from entering highly volatile countries,
most recognize that investing in MFOs involves being active in nations with varying amounts of
political and financial uncertainty (BlueOrchard, 2015; MicroRate, 2013). There is still the issue
for funders, though, of how to respond if uncertainty rises in a nation where they are active. One
option is simply to exit. Yet, in the microfinance context, this option is unlikely to be attractive.
Commercial funders dedicate considerable time to building expertise and relationships in a focal
country; many also have local offices with employees who monitor their national investments
(BlueOrchard, 2015; Lützenkirchen et al., 2012). These are significant commitments and do not
transfer easily to other contexts. Exiting a nation may also make reentry difficult when
uncertainty recedes. Reflecting this, a fund manager told us the following:
If a country where we have a position starts to become more uncertain with regard to the
economic or political climate, we start to get nervous. We’re not going to pull out unless
absolutely necessary [though]…you start to look like the big bad capitalist guys if you
just leave. It would make it hard for us to come back and we want to avoid that.
With this in mind, we expect that commercial funders will pursue financial returns under
uncertainty by shifting their lending behavior. To this end, studies have found that uncertainty
creates ambiguity about the link between an organization’s past and future performances, as
strategies that create strong performance in one environment may be ineffective in other contexts
(Audia et al., 2000). Moreover, Davis et al. (2009) found that many strategies produced strong
performance in stable environments but only a few remained effective when uncertainty
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increased. Studies also suggest that successful organizations can be reluctant to make strategic
changes (Boeker, 1997; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), and this is problematic when the environment
changes. For example, Audia et al. (2000) found that greater success leads firms to persist with
past strategies after major environmental change, negatively affecting subsequent performance.
As a consequence of past performance losing predictive validity in uncertain contexts,
studies suggest that resource providers are apt to shift their attention to visible, easy-to-evaluate
quality signals such as size and status (Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Podolny, 1994) that act as
proxies for organizational stability (Geroski et al., 2010). The bigger resource endowments of
large organizations may also help them to weather uncertainty and successfully alter their
strategies in response to environmental changes (Dobrev, Kim, & Carroll, 2003). This line of
reasoning is evident in the practitioner literature on microfinance, where authors have suggested
that MFO size creates a buffer against liquidity risks (Gonzalez, 2010), and that in uncertain
environments “asset managers [focus] their efforts on risk management and…tightening their
investment policies…[many move] up-market” (Glisovic & Reille, 2010).
This interpretation was echoed by the commercial funders we spoke to. Discussing his
firm’s response to uncertainty, an investment officer told us “we’re going to shift our local focus
to less risky [MFOs]...big [MFOs] tend to be pretty stable; they’re better bets to ride out
adversity, so we will be more interested in them.” Another said, “If a nation becomes more
volatile, we’ll certainly look at adjusting our position…when you don’t know how strategies are
going to play out, and what will be effective, size and reputation make a big difference, and these
are highly correlated.” Clearly linking these behavioral shifts to the application of financial logic,
a fund manager told us the following:
We need to preserve our [financial] position…. When things get turbulent we change how
we weight different factors…. The bottom line is that size becomes really important. You
don’t know what’s going to work and what isn’t. A larger [MFO] is more likely to be
stable, a stronger institution. All other indicators become really subjective and hard to
draw inferences from.
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As such, we expect that when political and financial uncertainty in a country rise,
investors who adhere to financial logic will focus more on the size of potential fund recipients
and less on past performance, as doing so should reduce risk and increase the prospect of
preserving a return on capital.6 Accordingly, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 3. When (a) political uncertainty or (b) financial uncertainty in a country
increase, the relationship between MFO size and commercial funding will become more
positive.
Hypothesis 4. When (a) political uncertainty or (b) financial uncertainty in a country
increase, the relationship between MFO financial performance and commercial funding
will become less positive.
Public Funders and Development Logic under Uncertainty
We expect that public funders will also shift their behavior when a nation becomes more
uncertain and do so in ways that they view as consistent with development logic. This means
that, as with commercial funders, exit is unlikely when a national environment changes. As a part
of their development aims, many public funders are mandated to disperse a set amount of money
in specific regions or countries (Goodman, 2007). Beyond this, pulling their capital would
undermine efforts to build capacity and foster stability in a nation’s microfinance sector. Indeed,
public funders generally try to play a countercyclical role by expanding activities to prevent a
credit crunch when a nation becomes volatile (Otero, 1999). Linking this to development logic, a
government official told us “[public] funders try to stay committed to countries that are facing
uncertainty; leaving would completely be against development principles.”
However, in staying in a nation, public funders must consider the implications that
uncertainty has for their development aims. While public funders are willing to accept higher
levels of investment risk to pursue development aims, capital recovery is still important. This is
related directly to development goals, particularly among the DFIs that comprise the majority of
public microfinance funding. DFIs are endowed with sovereign funds, but these are typically not
6

There are other ways in which a funder may manage potential investment risk, such as increasing interest rates or
issuing shorter-term loans. We examine these possibilities in our supplementary analyses.
19

replenished by the sponsoring government (Hoffman, 1998). As such, the ability of these funders
to pursue ongoing development aims requires them to retain and grow their capital base (Griffith
& Evans, 2012). Government agencies also face pressure to show they are making responsible
budget allocation decisions (Lancaster, 2008). Further, funders have a finite amount of capital to
invest, and this means that development goals are arguably best pursued by funding MFOs that
can endure adversity. This was supported by our interviewees, such as the government official
who told us, “[public funders] need returns to continue investing. How do you do development
[work] if you lose all your money?” Similarly, a DFI manager said, “If [our] investments default
what good would that do for the sector? Development means an MFO has to be there tomorrow.”
With this in mind, we expect that the attention of public funders will shift toward MFO
size when uncertainty increases, as larger MFOs are more likely to be seen as able to weather
uncertainty (Josefy et al., 2015). This was echoed by many of our interviewees, who rationalized
a focus on larger MFOs by appealing to development aims. Said one, “When a country gets
volatile…you need someone to prop up the cornerstone institutions…sad as it is to say, the little
guys are going to be exposed…the top tier [MFOs] are going to be able to pay you back.”
Delving further into the rationale for this shift, another DFI manager said this to us:
It makes sense from a development perspective that you would move to larger [MFOs] as
a country gets volatile to make sure you’re not getting too much exposure in your
portfolio. If these guys go under, that’s not good for the sector, and it’s not good for us.
The potential development impact is much higher for a larger, more stable [MFO] that is
going to be around to help anchor the sector tomorrow than it is to [keep pumping]
money into one that might get itself into a liquidity crunch if the country stays volatile.
Based on this, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 5. When (a) political uncertainty or (b) financial uncertainty in a country
increase, the relationship between MFO size and public funding will become less
negative.
As we argued above, an MFO’s financial performance is not likely to be an investment
consideration among public funders in stable environments. Because past performance is a lessvalid predictor of future performance under uncertainty (Davis et al., 2009), we do not expect
20

uncertainty to affect public funders’ reliance on this consideration when making loan decisions.
DATA AND METHODS
To date, research on microfinance funding has been constrained by a lack of publicly
available data. The Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) and the Consultative Group to
Assist the Poor (CGAP) both collect funding data but do not publicly disclose raw figures.
Ratings agencies like MicroRate also collect data but only for a limited number of MFOs, most
of which are in Latin America (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011). Addressing this limitation, we
were able to negotiate access to the raw MFO funding data collected by the MIX and compile a
comprehensive database of microfinance funding.
The MIX is a nonprofit organization that acts as the major information provider on the
microfinance industry. Founded by the World Bank, the MIX aims to provide comprehensive,
objective, and relevant information about microfinance that is standardized and comparable
across countries. MIX data are reliable and have been used widely in previous studies (e.g.,
Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Cull et al., 2009). As a part of its data-gathering efforts, the MIX
began to track MFO funding data systematically starting in 2004. For each lending transaction,
the MIX records the funder’s name, type, country of origin, and amount of capital lent to the
MFO in US dollars. In some cases, the interest rate and loan term are also recorded. Following
conventional practice, and in consultation with the MIX, we categorized each funder as a
commercial, public, or charitable organization, as reflected in Table 1.
The final dataset covers 891 MFOs in 92 countries that borrowed from 1,490 funders
between 2004 and 2012. Based on our own calculations and estimates from our contacts at the
MIX, this accounts for about 90 percent of the financing acquired by MFOs around the world
over our analysis period.7 Our data thus comprise the most comprehensive, cross-sectional timeseries database of transactions between funders and MFOs that has been compiled to date.
7

To calculate the coverage of our funding data, we divided the total outstanding loan amount per year by the total
liabilities reported by MFOs in the MIX’s publicly available financial data.
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Variable Definitions
Dependent variables. Using data from the MIX funding database, we constructed two
outcome variables—commercial and public capital—that respectively capture the inflation
adjusted logged amount of capital in USD acquired by a focal MFO from these funder types in a
specific year. In cases where an MFO did not receive any loan dollars from either a commercial
or public funder, we set the corresponding value to 1 prior to logging.
Independent variables. Our key independent variables are indexes that encompass
multiple measures of both MFO size and financial performance. Unlike agencies that combine
size, performance, and transparency indicators to form a single aggregate measure of MFO
investment risk (MicroRate, 2013), we assembled separate indicators for each of these.
Exploratory factor analysis verified that the indicators load onto three distinct factors and should
be analyzed separately. We describe each indicator in Table 2.
-----Insert Table 2 about here----To validate these exploratory findings, we performed a confirmatory-factor analysis with
maximum-likelihood estimation procedures. The expected three-factor solution was an excellent
fit with the data (RMSEA = 0.029, CFI = 0.981, TLI = 0.969), and all factor loadings were
significant at the .001 level. Based on this, we generated factor scores that reflect the size,
financial performance, and transparency of each MFO in our analysis. We include transparency
as a control variable because we expect (and find) that it is similarly relevant to all funders.
At the country level, we included measures for political uncertainty and financial
uncertainty based on data compiled by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Used
widely by researchers (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel, 2014; Boubakri, Mansi, &
Saffar, 2013; Dell'Ariccia & Marquez, 2010), the ICRG draws on 22 metrics and evaluates 140
countries in terms of their political, economic, and financial uncertainty.8 We focus on the
8

Note that ICRG calls these variables “risks.” However, our consultation with the data source suggests that ICRG
does not follow the scholarly distinction between uncertainty and risk. In fact, the way ICRG approaches political
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political and financial uncertainty scores of the countries in our database because the measure of
economic uncertainty is highly correlated with the measure of financial uncertainty (p = .77) and
overlaps with various control variables that we discuss below (e.g., GDP per capita).
Political uncertainty comprises 12 measures that capture the degree of political stability
in a country: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal
conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order,
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality. The variable is measured on
a 100-point scale, with higher values indicating lower uncertainty. Hence, we reverse-coded it so
higher values denote greater uncertainty. Financial uncertainty reflects a country’s ability to meet
its commercial and trade debt obligations. It is constructed as a 50-point scale and includes five
components: foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of
exports, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and services, net international
liquidity as months of import cover, and exchange-rate stability. Again, we reverse-coded this
variable. To test hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, we interacted MFO size and financial performance with
the two country-level uncertainty variables using mean-centered values.
Control variables. Commercial and public capital funding may relate to several factors
not included in our hypotheses. To account for the overall wealth of the country where an MFO
resides, we include a measure of GDP per capita (logged). Microfinance funding may also be
influenced by the prevalence of aid already being received in the MFO country. Therefore, we
controlled for net official development assistance (Net ODA) as a percentage of gross national
income (Lacalle & Alfonso, 2011). Given that the degree to which a nation is economically
integrated into the world society likely influences its ability to attract capital, we controlled for
economic globalization, which is an index measure based on a country’s trade and investment
flows, portfolio investment, income payments to foreign nationals, import barriers, tariff rates,
and financial risks is consistent with our definition of uncertainty provided in footnote 4. We expect the political and
financial uncertainty of a country to exacerbate investment risks faced by commercial and public funders.
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international trade taxes, and capital account restrictions. These data are from Dreher (2006) and
the measure forms a 100-point scale in which higher values indicate greater globalization.
In light of past research that has suggested cross-country similarities may affect
microfinance funding flows (Garmaise & Natividad, 2013), we controlled for three types of
lender-MFO country distance: economic (differences in economic development and
macroeconomic characteristics), financial (differences in financial-sector development), and
political (differences in political stability, democracy, and trade-bloc membership). Using data
collected by Berry and colleagues (2010), we first calculated the average of each distance
between the MFO country and all its lender countries, which generated an average score,
respectively, for economic, financial, and political distance for each MFO-year. Because the
three distance variables are highly correlated (p = 0.52-0.74), we took an overall average across
all three and included it as a control for country distance in the models.
In addition, one alternative explanation for our hypothesized results is that increasing
financial and political uncertainty affects the composition of a country’s microfinance sector
such that smaller, less-sustainable MFOs fail or are acquired, leaving only larger MFOs to
receive funds. To account for this possibility, we included three variables based on the
composition of a country’s microfinance sector. To control for sector size and growth, we
included a measure of the number of new MFOs founded per country-year as well as the number
of active MFOs. We also included a measure of microfinance industry concentration for each
nation, which is calculated using a Herfindahl index based on each MFO’s share of assets in the
sector. These variables reflect the vibrancy of a country’s microfinance sector, how many MFOs
may actively be seeking funding, and whether the industry is consolidating or otherwise
becoming more concentrated. The measures were calculated using the MIX data.
We also include a number of MFO-level controls. Because nonprofit MFOs can accept
charitable donations and nongovernmental organization (NGO) grants—which are not included
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in our data—they may be less likely to seek loans (Gonzalez, 2010). Thus, we control for
nonprofit status (coded as “1” for nonprofit). We also control for MFO age in years and
efficiency, which is the logged number of borrowers served per loan officer of each MFO, a
standard measure in the microfinance literature (MicroRate, 2013). As noted above, we also
controlled for an MFO’s transparency. As detailed in Table 2, the variable is based on an MFO’s
Diamond Score from the MIX, which rates the quality and level of transparency in financial
reporting, and its regulatory status, which is associated with specific reporting requirements.
Each covariate is lagged one year, with the exception of MFO age. Descriptive statistics
and correlations are presented in Table 3. We checked for possible multicollinearity in our model
by conducting a variance inflation factor (VIF) test. The maximum VIF score obtained was 7.82
and the mean VIF was 2.72, both below the commonly used threshold value of 10 (e.g.,
Kennedy, 1992), indicating that multicollinearity was not a concern.9
-----Insert Table 3 about here----Analytic Approach
In this study, the unit of analysis is the MFO, and the unit of observation is the MFOyear. Our primary dependent variables are commercial and public capital. Each MFO for each
year, therefore, has a separate observation for each dependent variable. Based on this, we ran
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models for the amount of commercial capital received
per MFO-year, and for the amount of public capital received per MFO-year. All models include
country-fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level and to isolate
cross-MFO differences in capital acquisition. A fixed effects model accounts for a country’s
unobserved characteristics that do not vary over time that may affect MFO funding. This
specification is achieved by subtracting the values of each observation from the country mean,
removing all between-country differences and leaving only the within-country variation to be
9

High VIFs are not unusual with the inclusion of interaction variables as the correlations between variables and
their interaction terms are high by design. In this case, multicollinearity does not have serious adverse consequences.
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explained by the covariates (Wooldridge, 2006). Year-fixed effects were also included to control
for any unobserved changes in the macro environment that might affect MFO funding over time.
For robustness, we also analyzed the data using different model specifications, which we discuss
in our section for robustness checks and supplemental analyses.
RESULTS
We present the results of our OLS analyses of commercial and public capital acquired by
MFOs in Table 4. In model 1, we include only the controls. In models 2 through 8, we test our
hypotheses. Model 2 includes the two hypothesized measures of MFO risk: size and financial
performance. Models 3 and 4 add the interaction between political uncertainty and size and
financial uncertainty and size, respectively. Model 5 includes both size interactions. Models 6
and 7 look at the interactions between political uncertainty and performance and financial
uncertainty and performance, respectively. Model 8 contains both performance interactions.
As shown in model 1, both commercial and public funders loan less money to nonprofit
MFOs as compared to for-profit ones. This is consistent with research that suggests nonprofit
MFOs may rely more heavily on other forms of funding, such as charitable grants (Gonzalez,
2010). There is also a positive relationship between commercial and public funding and MFO
age and transparency. Notably, the positive impact of transparency on commercial capital
becomes insignificant when MFO size and financial performance are also included in the model.
This may reflect an effort among public funders to offset some of the risks associated with
funding smaller and less financially strong MFOs by ensuring that those they do lend to have
more transparent reporting. There are also a number of differences between commercial and
public funders. In nations where economic globalization increased, MFOs received less money
from public funders. MFOs in countries with more MFOs received fewer loan dollars from
public funders, while MFOs in countries with more MFO foundings received more loan dollars
from commercial funders. MFOs also tend to acquire more commercial capital from lenders
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based in more economically, financially, and politically distant countries. This may reflect
commercial capital flows from more developed countries (e.g., United States and Netherlands) to
developing countries. In our supplemental analyses, we further investigate whether our results
remain after accounting for the home-country effect of lenders.
Model 1 also shows how country uncertainty affects commercial and public capital flows
to a nation’s microfinance sector. As expected, there is little evidence of capital flight (i.e., rapid
outflow of capital from a nation due to unfavorable events). Financial uncertainty is negatively
and significantly related to commercial funding, but there is no effect for political uncertainty.
Neither political nor financial uncertainty has a significant impact on public funding.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that commercial capital will be positively related to an MFO’s (a)
size and (b) financial performance. Results from model 2 support both predictions and show that
commercial funders invest in MFOs that are larger and financially stronger. Holding all
covariates at their mean level, the predicted value of commercial investment is $2,495,500.83. A
one standard deviation increase in MFO size (0.97) raises the predicted value of commercial
investment by about 128% ($3,194,241.06), while a one standard deviation increase in financial
performance (0.43) raises the predicted value by about 33% ($823,515.27).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that public funders will lend to MFOs that are (a) smaller and (b)
less financially strong. The coefficient for MFO size is in the predicted negative direction but is
not significant. Though the results are consistent with the argument that public funders are not
sensitive to MFO size in their investment decisions, hypothesis 2a is not supported. Our results
provide direct support for hypothesis 2b, though, and show that public funders are more likely to
invest in MFOs with weaker financial performance. Holding all covariates at their mean level,
the predicted value of public investment is $53,103.60. A one standard deviation increase in
financial performance (0.43) lowers the predicted value by about 51% ($27,082.84). While there
is anecdotal evidence of commercial and public funders competing to invest in the same MFOs
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(e.g., Abrams & Von Stauffenberg, 2007), our results suggest that, on average, commercial
capital goes to larger, financially stronger MFOs, while public capital goes to MFOs of varying
sizes that have relatively weaker financial performance. Thus, per the logics approach, in stable
environments commercial and public funders appear to be guided by different considerations and
channel money to different MFOs.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that when (a) political uncertainty and (b) financial uncertainty in
a country increase, the relationship between commercial funding and MFO size will become
more positive. Hypothesis 5 predicted a positive interaction between MFO size and (a) political
uncertainty and (b) financial uncertainty for public funders, such that the relationship between
public funding and MFO size will become less negative. The results from models 3 and 4 show
positive and significant interactions for political uncertainty and size and financial uncertainty
and size for both commercial and public funders, supporting hypotheses 3 and 5. Yet as models 2
and 3 indicate, the main effect of MFO size was not significant for public funders. Hence, rather
than the effect becoming less negative, the relationship between size and public capital becomes
positive as political uncertainty increases. Similarly, model 4 reveals that the relationship
between MFO size and public capital also becomes positive as financial uncertainty increases. In
model 5, the interaction of size and political uncertainty is insignificant for public funders when
both sets of interactions are included. Still, as we expected, the results overall show a clear
pattern of capital flowing from both funder types to larger MFOs as country uncertainty
increases.
To gain more insight into the interaction effects, we plotted the significant interactions
based on models 3 and 4 in Figure 1. We also followed Aiken and West’s (1991) procedure and
conducted simple slope tests for significant interactive terms. In separate equations, we split the
two uncertainty variables into two groups—low (below the mean) and high (above the mean)—
and estimated the effect of MFO size and on both commercial and public capital for both levels.
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We find that MFO size significantly predicts commercial funding when political uncertainty is
high (simple slope b = 3.036, p < 0.001) and when it is low (b = 1.011, p < 0.001). MFO size
also significantly predicts public funding when political uncertainty is high (simple slope b =
1.829, p < 0.05), but not when it is low (b = -0.505, p > 0.10). We similarly find that MFO size
significantly predicts commercial funding when financial uncertainty is high (simple slope b =
3.365, p < 0.001) and when it is low (b = 1.037, p < 0.001). MFO size also significantly predicts
public funding when financial uncertainty is high (simple slope b = 8.298, p < 0.001), but not
when it is low (b = -0.735, p > 0.10).
In models 6 through 8, we find mixed support for hypothesis 4, which predicted that
when political uncertainty and financial uncertainty in a country increase, the relationship
between commercial funding and MFO financial performance will become less positive. As
political uncertainty increases, the financial performance of MFOs becomes a less heavily
weighted criterion in commercial funders’ lending decisions. We do not observe a similar effect
for financial uncertainty, however. This may be due to the fact that MFOs with strong past
financial performance are well-positioned to deal with the volatility introduced by domestic
inflation and currency devaluations (which can be partly managed through local currency loans
from a funder), whereas the more fundamental changes to the “rules of the game” that may
accompany political uncertainty (North, 1991) might make it difficult to predict future financial
performance from the past (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). As expected, the financial performance
of MFOs does not affect public funders under higher country uncertainty.
In Figure 2, we plot the significant interaction based on model 6. We again ran a simple
slopes test by splitting political uncertainty into a low and high group as described above and
estimating the effect of financial performance on commercial capital. Results show that financial
performance is not significantly related to commercial funding when political uncertainty is high
(b = -0.741, p > 0.10), but it is when political uncertainty is low (b = 1.733, p < 0.001).
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-----Insert Table 4 and Figures 1 and 2 about here----Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analyses
We conducted a number of robustness checks and ran a variety of supplementary models
to help rule out alternate explanations and bolster our findings. The results of these analyses can
be viewed at https://mfifunding.wordpress.com.
Alternate modeling approaches. We took steps to ensure our findings were robust to
alternate modeling approaches. First, it is possible that the funds an MFO receives from one
funder-type (e.g., public) may correlate with those it receives from another (e.g., commercial). If
true, separate equations might lead to inefficient estimates, with disturbances contemporaneously
correlated across equations (Zellner & Huang, 1962). To account for this possibility, we used
seemingly unrelated regression, which enables joint estimation of multiple regression models,
each with its own error term, and thus corrects for the possibility of correlation among error
terms (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). Our findings are robust to this alternate approach.
There may also be concerns with modeling multilevel data such as ours (i.e., MFOs
within nations) using OLS regression because the standard errors of observations at lower levels
of analysis may not be independent. To ensure this did not bias our results, we used hierarchical
linear regression, or multilevel mixed-effects models (HLM). Results are consistent with our
reported models. However, while this approach explicitly accounts for the multilevel nature of
our data, we chose to report OLS models as our main analysis for three reasons: (1) OLS is more
commonly used than HLM, which eases interpretation of our results among a broader readership;
(2) the use of country-fixed effects in OLS helps to address non-independence of standard errors
across levels of analysis, and (3) standard HLM models do not allow us to control for potential
unobserved country-level variables as with fixed effects OLS regression (Chaplin, 2003).
Alternate dependent variables. Another potential issue is that, while there is precedent
for analyzing overall investment levels in both the management (e.g., Pahnke et al., 2015; Wry et
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al., 2014) and microfinance literatures (Gonzalez, 2010; Sapundzhieva, 2011), there are other
potential ways to measure funding. We ran models with alternate dependent variables to ensure
our results were robust to different measures. First, the practical value of a loan may be related to
its term (Fama & French, 2012). For example, a $1 million loan may have different implications
if its repayment term is two versus ten years. While data for loan term is not as complete as for
loan amount, we constructed an alternate variable where we divided the amount of each loan by
its term in years. Despite the data loss, results using this variable were similar to our reported
findings. Second, while there are good reasons to expect funders respond to uncertainty by
shifting which MFOs they lend to, the finance literature points to other potential responses;
namely charging higher interest and/or reducing the length of the loan term (Fama & French,
2012). While data for these measures are sparse, we ran models using interest rate and loan
length as dependent variables. The results are more suggestive than authoritative, but there is
little to suggest these are tools that either funder-type typically uses in response to uncertainty.
Alternate influences on funder behavior. In developing our approach, we argued that it
is important to attend to the ways that environmental uncertainty affects organizational behavior.
We recognize, however, that the environment includes unmeasured features that may affect how
an organization acts. This issue is accounted for, in part, by our use of country-fixed effects, as
this addresses unobserved variance in each nation where loans are made. Still, many funders are
not based in the countries where they make loans, and this means that their behavior may also be
affected by home-country influences. As a check, we ran separate models comparing funders in
the United States and the Netherlands—the nations with the most microfinance funders—to all
other foreign funders. We do not observe any systematic differences across these funders, thus
suggesting that home-country influences do not affect our results in a meaningful way.
In addition, while the microfinance literature suggests that commercial and public funders
comprise meaningful groupings, as Table 1 shows, there are subtypes therein. We took steps to
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ensure that subgroup heterogeneity was not a concern in our analysis. Models that distinguish
between different types of commercial and public funders show that, while overall patterns are
mostly similar across subtypes, there are some differences. Most notably, government funders
differ from DFIs in that they seem to favor larger MFOs. Still, we urge caution when interpreting
these results as the number of government funders in any one nation is small, making countryfixed effects models unstable. In comparison, there are many DFIs present in most nations, and
these collectively account for a much greater portion of overall funding (Sapundzhieva, 2011).
Also, while there are good theoretical reasons—supported by our interviews—to expect
that the behavioral patterns we observe are a result of funders acting in logic-consistent ways in
settled versus uncertain contexts, an alternate explanation is that they are changing their logics.
Studies suggest this might happen if there is a field-level shift in expectations for how certain
types of firms should behave, or if individual firms are motivated to replace their leadership with
people who adhere to a different logic (Haveman & Rao, 1997; Thornton, 1999). We see little
evidence for either. Many funders operate in multiple countries, and most investment funds,
private equities, and DFIs are based in the United States or Western Europe (Gonzalez, 2010).
We found nothing in the microfinance literature to suggest that expectations for how commercial
or public funders should behave shifted over our analysis period at either the field-level, or
individually across countries. It seems equally unlikely that funders would be motivated to alter
their overall interests in response to uncertainty in individual host countries.
Still, we took steps to empirically rule out this alternate explanation. As the concern with
logic change is primarily relevant for public funders, we focused our analysis on them. First, we
ran funder-fixed effects models comparing public funder behavior in the most (top half) and least
(bottom half) uncertain nations in our analysis. As expected, we see a large difference in the
coefficients for MFO size. These results suggest that behavior is being driven by country-level
factors, rather than a logic shift at the funder-level. As a further check, we also ran models with
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fixed effects at the funder-MFO dyad level. This specification analyzes temporal differences in
the relationship between a given funder and a given MFO. Results show a positive significant
interaction between MFO size and uncertainty, and a modestly significant negative interaction
between MFO performance and uncertainty. This shows that uncertainty influences specific
MFO investment relationships over time, providing additional evidence against logic change.
Finally, it is possible that MFO size and performance capture management quality,
which might suggest a different interpretation of our results. This issue is partially accounted for
through the inclusion of MFO transparency in our models, as there is evidence that financial
reporting quality is associated with professional management (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010).
Still, we took the additional step of investigating this using a survey that we distributed to each
MFO in our analysis. The goal was to collect data on each MFO’s management quality by asking
“How important are the following to your organization: (1) formal rules and procedures, (2)
internal financial controls, (3) employee training, (4) internal efficiency, (5) risk management,
and (6) personal accountability?”10 In sum, we received 193 responses and found no systematic
response bias (i.e., size, performance, and transparency of responding and nonresponding MFOs
were similar). We used this data to build an additive index of MFO management quality. While
the small sample size precluded using the variable in formal models, the measure is not highly
correlated with MFO size (-.04) or performance (-.13). Thus, while management quality may be
a relevant investment consideration, it appears to be distinct from our key independent variables.
Implications of our findings. It is important to understand the consequences of our
finding that funding increasingly flows to large MFOs when a nation becomes more uncertain.
An obvious implication is that smaller MFOs may find it difficult to finance their loan portfolios
even if they are financially sustainable, which negatively affects the health of these organizations
and can undermine competition in a country’s microfinance sector (Abrams & Von Stauffenberg,
10

The practitioner literature suggests that these are key factors that reflect an MFO’s commitment to professional
management (Ikeanyibe, 2009; MicroRate, 2013).
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2007). There are also concerns about capital flowing primarily to larger MFOs because some
have suggested these organizations are less committed to social outreach (Frank, 2008).
To test this directly, we use generalized least squares models with MFO-level fixed
effects to test the relationship between MFO size and two measures commonly used in the
microfinance literature to assess social outreach: average loan size, which captures the extent to
which MFOs target higher-income clients who can afford to borrow larger amounts; and the
proportion of borrowers who are women, which captures an MFO’s willingness to target the
most at-risk population of potential clients (Cull et al., 2009; Roberts, 2013). Results are shown
in Table 5 and show that, on average, larger MFOs engage in significantly less outreach. The
shifts we observe in funder behavior may thus have negative effects on a nation’s microfinance
sector. When financial uncertainty and political uncertainty increase, loans flow to larger MFOs
and away from others that are more highly committed to poverty reduction.
-----Insert Table 5 about here----DISCUSSION
Over the past three decades, microfinance has emerged as an important tool to combat
poverty. While research has focused primarily on the downstream impacts of lending to the poor
(e.g., Banerjee et al., 2015), we analyze upstream funding flows. Doing so is important because
most MFOs are not self-financed but rather intermediaries that aggregate external funds and
disperse them as loans (Sapundzhieva, 2011). Although funding is a critical component of the
microfinance ecosystem, scholarly inquiry in the area has been limited. Academics have made
important inroads into enhancing our understanding of microfinance funding by studying crossnational capital flows and interest rates (Garmaise & Natividad, 2010; Tchuigoua, 2014).
Practitioner research has used largely anecdotal evidence to argue that funders compete to invest
in the largest, financially strongest MFOs (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011).
By leveraging the most inclusive database that has been assembled to date, our study
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provides the first systematic global analysis of microfinance funding. We apply insights about
institutional logics to make baseline predictions about lending differences among commercial
and public funders. We then extend this to consider how the types of behavior that a logic
produces might shift in the face of growing uncertainty. As expected, we find that commercial
and public funders lend to different types of MFOs in stable environments but that this difference
recedes as the external environment becomes less predictable. Under such conditions, both types
of funders focus more heavily on MFO size, whereas financial performance becomes less
important as an investment criterion. Smaller MFOs are thus less likely to attract funding, which
has potentially negative implications for the level of competition, service, and social outreach in
a nation’s microfinance sector (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011; Wiesner & Quien, 2010).
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Implications for organizational theory. Theoretically, our primary contribution is to
advance knowledge about the link between institutional logics and organizational practices. As
numerous studies have shown, the logics perspective helps to explain organizational action by
recognizing that shared beliefs about appropriate behavior—or cultural influences—are not just
externally imposed (Scott, 2001) but are also internalized by decision-makers (Thornton et al.,
2012). As a result, firms that adhere to the same logic tend to behave in similar ways. Yet, while
this work has enhanced our understanding about why organizations within the same field or
industry act differently, a focus on singular contexts has contributed to theoretical blind spots
related to the influence of broader contextual forces that may affect the types of behavior that are
associated with a logic. Indeed, despite recognizing that firms often operate across multiple
geographies, most studies have assumed that logics are linked to specific practices (Vasudeva et
al., 2013). Some have suggested that this link is not always so tight and that practices may
change due to learning (Feldman & Pentland, 2003), drift (Clemens & Cook, 1999), or active
deviation (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). Still, behavioral shifts are theorized as idiosyncratic
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and unlikely to generate systemic change unless actors mobilize to alter a field’s dominant logic
(Rao et al., 2003), frame contested practices as legitimate (Smets et al., 2012), or replace a firm’s
top managers (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
Our study adds insight by showing that organizations that adhere to a given logic may
behave in reliably different ways depending on the environment they are in. Specifically, we
connect the logics perspective with research on how firms respond to uncertainty in the external
environment. We note that uncertainty disrupts the link between actions and expected outcomes
and thus creates an impetus for behavioral change (Davis et al., 2009). As logics serve as the lens
through which decision-makers interpret and respond to the external environment, we show that
uncertainty leads to organizations altering their behavior in ways that are perceived as rational
for pursuing their interests. As a result, the practices of firms that adhere to different logics may
converge or diverge in different contexts. Our study therefore highlights the contextual nature of
the link between logics and practices and helps sensitize scholars to outcomes that might be
missed by applying the logics perspective alone.
In this way, we go beyond studies that have examined the influence of multiple logics
and externally imposed institutional demands as sources of practice variation (e.g., Greenwood et
al., 2011) and direct attention to the potential for material forces to mediate the influence of
cultural ones. This hearkens back to early organizational research where scholars endeavored to
map the features of the external environment (Emery & Trist, 1965; Thompson, 1967) and
suggests that this work is relevant to contemporary theoretical debates. Indeed, we show that by
considering the material features of a firm’s environment, further insight can be gained into how
actors use logics as a resource to guide behavior, rather than conforming to specific behavioral
precepts oblivious to contextual contingencies (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2014; Pache
& Santos, 2013; Wry & York, 2015). We anticipate that future research will work to deepen our
understanding of the ways in which cultural and material influences work in tandem to shape
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organizational action. Further, while we focus on one facet of the external environment, our
approach could be easily extended to consider how practices associated with a logic might differ
across communities (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), societies (Vasudeva et al., 2013), or
industries (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), thus suggesting a broad range of research applications.
In addition, our study has implications for research on foreign aid which, for the most
part, has focused on understanding aggregate funding flows between countries (e.g., Fleck &
Kilby, 2006). We show that organizational theory can help to derive novel insights by drawing
attention to the interests and actions of the firms that provide these funds. This is important
because a focus on overall funding flows says little about the uses and efficacy of aid dollars
(Alesina & Dollar, 2000). The substantive work of poverty reduction is done by organizations;
examining how they are funded has the potential to yield more granular insights that link aid
dollars to outcomes of interest. The application of institutional logics thus has the potential to
extend our understanding of the dynamics of foreign aid by unearthing organization-level
variance that is masked in country-level analyses. As such, our study suggests an important role
for organizational theory in linking organizational decision-making to practices that directly
affect societal welfare (see also Cobb, 2016; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013).
Implications for microfinance research. It is generally accepted that funders consider
MFO size, financial performance, and transparency in their funding decisions. Yet, while studies
have suggested that these attributes are differently attended to by commercial and public funders,
there have been no systematic predictions about the nature of these differences. In this regard,
the institutional logics perspective usefully directs attention to the varying bases of interest and
action among different types of funders, and thus supports predictions about which MFO features
are attended to and valued when making lending decisions. The logics perspective also supports
predictions about how an organization’s actions, but not interests, might change under different
conditions, thus helping to reconcile conflicting claims about commercial and public funders
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being competitors rather than complements (Gonzalez, 2010; Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011).
A focus on country-level uncertainty also helps to illuminate the influence of national
context on microfinance sector health and efficacy. Environmental uncertainties are recognized
as important in microfinance funding decisions (BlueOrchard, 2015; Kiva, 2015), but this
assumption has not yet been examined empirically. Our findings suggest that smaller MFOs will
find it difficult to access funding as uncertainty rises, which can strain an MFO’s cash position
and increase its risk of failing (Reille et al., 2011). Further, when capital flows into larger MFOs
that engage in less social outreach, a smaller portion of external funding can be expected to reach
very poor and female borrowers. This is especially problematic when uncertainty in a nation
rises, as this disrupts labor markets, creates unforeseen expenses, and reduces purchasing power,
all of which increase the likelihood of vulnerable groups falling into poverty (Adger, 2006; Sen,
1981). There is also evidence that entrepreneurship increases in volatile environments (George,
Kotha, Parikh, Alnuaimi, & Bahaj, 2015), furthering the need for microfinance. Our findings
thus suggest that rising uncertainty creates more need for microfinance but works through the
logics of different funders to undermine outreach in the sector.
We also make an empirical contribution to microfinance research. To date, practitioners
and ratings agencies have used composite measures that combine MFO size, performance, and
transparency to organize MFOs into risk tiers (MicroRate, 2013; Sapundzhieva, 2011). We cast
doubt on the empirical validity of this approach by showing that these factors do not correlate in
a way that supports their integration. We also show that size and performance are differently
weighted by commercial and public funders and that the importance of these variables shifts in
different ways as a nation becomes more uncertain. The relationship between funding and MFO
attributes is thus more nuanced and contextually dependent than what has been portrayed to date.
Practical implications. Our study also has implications for MFOs. In particular, results
suggest that one way in which MFOs can maintain access to funding under uncertainty is to
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grow. Strategies such as organic growth, mergers, or extra-organizational linkages such as
consortia or alliances may help an MFO buffer against rising uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). Such strategies may be difficult, though, especially in volatile environments. We looked
for examples of these strategies in response to uncertainty, but did not find any instances in our
data or in the practitioner literature. It may be wise, though, for an MFO to proactively form
alliances or expand operations in placid environments as a hedge against future uncertainty.
Also, unreported models suggest that transparent MFOs may receive more loans from
commercial and public funders as uncertainty increases.11 Thus, improved financial reporting
may be a cost-effective way for an MFO to stabilize resource flows under uncertainty.
Our study also has implications for public funders. While their individual actions may be
consistent with development logic, the collective result of lending to larger MFOs as uncertainty
rises is likely at odds with sector development. Given that the link between logics and practices
is potentially fluid, this suggests that public funders should consider the collective outcomes of
their behavior and work to redefine appropriate action in such contexts (Wry, Lounsbury, &
Glynn, 2011). In this regard, one option might be to collaborate and form a reserve capital pool
that is dedicated to helping small and financially vulnerable MFOs weather uncertainty. This is
not unprecedented, as a number of public funders banded together during the global financial
crisis to seed a US$500 million fund that targeted adversely affected MFOs (Reille et al., 2011).
Further, there may be public policy mechanisms that can help reduce the adverse effects
of political and financial uncertainty on MFO funding. Because MFO loan default is the main
investment risk for a funder, policies and initiatives that help reduce this risk may be an effective
means by which smaller MFOs that are more focused on social outreach can still receive funding
when environmental uncertainty increases. To the extent that foreign governments and aid
agencies see development finance as valuable tool for supporting a nation’s microfinance sector,

11

These models are available to view at https://mfifunding.wordpress.com/supplementary-analyses/.
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offering loan guarantees or other forms of protection may help to inoculate funders against
increasing uncertainty that would otherwise alter their investment behavior. Similarly, providing
subsidized loan insurance to smaller MFOs may help these organizations weather environmental
shocks that affect their ability to obtain capital and repay their loans. Host country governments
may also offer such protections, through this may become challenging as they, themselves, are
forced to deal with rising uncertainty. Thus, while loan guarantees and insurance systems may
create moral hazards and adverse selection, careful initiatives may lower MFO investments risks,
thereby contributing to stable investment flows and a healthy funding ecology amid uncertainty.
Limitations and Future Research
There are limitations to our study that highlight opportunities for future research.
Empirically, our analysis is limited to debt financing and thus is not inclusive of all MFO
funding. While the vast majority of funds are issued through loans, future studies should examine
other types of investment, such as grants and equity. Also, because our data only track loans, we
are unable to analyze funds that support capacity building and regulatory infrastructure in a
nation’s microfinance sector. Additional analyses will be possible as this data becomes available.
Further, while funding is a crucial part of the microfinance ecosystem, we recognize that
its effects are contingent on a nation’s capacity to regulate the microfinance sector (Ledgerwood
et al., 2013). When safeguards are not in place to guard against over-borrowing by clients and
unhealthy competition among MFOs, there is evidence that increased funding can have negative
consequences. For instance, a glut of foreign capital contributed to a proliferation of Bosnian
MFOs that competed with each other for business, issued progressively riskier loans, and made
the sector susceptible to crisis (Reille et al., 2011). Thus, while uncertainty contributes to one set
of challenges in microfinance funding, stable contexts may come with their own issues. Our
findings should be interpreted with this consideration in mind.
Finally, while our analysis suggests that organizations shift their behavior in ways that
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they perceive as logic-consistent, other audiences may have a different interpretation. Indeed,
there is evidence that some microfinance observers consider it ‘mission drift’ when public
funders invest in large MFOs (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011). While there are no data for us
to examine this or its implications directly, it nonetheless points to interesting avenues for future
research. Debates about mission drift are endemic to sectors where firms pursue both financial
and social aims (Battilana & Lee, 2014); our approach suggests this may be due to conflicting
interpretations from internal and external audiences about what sorts of behavior are appropriate
vis-à-vis a particular logic. We envision future research examining conflicts that arise, not just
among groups that adhere to different logics but also among those that disagree over how to
interpret the same logic. It would be interesting to study the challenges this presents for
organizations, especially those pursuing pro-social aims.
CONCLUSION
Microfinance is a tool with the potential to make a meaningful contribution to global
poverty reduction. Yet in their attempts to study the impacts of microfinance loans, scholars have
largely overlooked the question of how these loans are financed. Building on and extending the
institutional logics perspective and using the most comprehensive database of microfinance
funding constructed to date, we show that commercial and public funders invest in different
types of MFOs in stable environments but these differences retreat in potentially problematic
ways as uncertainty increases and the need for microfinance intensifies. In so doing, the research
presented here suggests that an organizational approach can usefully illuminate processes that
shape the efficacy of microfinance as a way to address the grand challenge of global poverty.
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Table 1. Description and Statistics on Microfinance Funder Types
Funder
Type

Sub-types

# of
Lenders*

(%) of all
Loans

Avg Loan
Size ($US)

Illustrative Mission Statements
Combating poverty is [our] ultimate goal... as part of Spain’s overall
foreign policy

Government Programs and
Aid Agencies
244

Public

25.20%

$ 1,085,163

Development Finance
Institutions

The Group is committed to alleviating poverty; promoting human
development; science and technology; Islamic economics; banking and
finance; and enhancing cooperation amongst member countries, in
collaboration with our development partners
The Company seeks to achieve a commercially acceptable total return
that will meet or exceed historical returns achieved in the microfinance
area of the financial sector in emerging markets primarily via long-term
capital appreciation of portfolio investments

Financial Institutions

Commercial

Private Corporations

990

71.40%

$ 1,212,751

Microfinance Investment
Funds

Non-Governmental
Organizations

To deliver superior returns to our investors by investing in companies
improving livelihood or providing access to essential services for lowincome communities in emerging markets
The objective... is to promote microfinance as a viable investment option
through the development and management of a marketable portfolio of
high performing MFI funds, each offering "double bottom-line" returns
comparable with traditional capital market
Reaching out to the largest number of the poor and disadvantaged
households with appropriate microfinance services to enable them to
realize their untapped potentials of development through the network of
partner [MFO]s

Foundations

Charitable

[The organization] was established in 1991 to provide a focused
approach to the development of the micro enterprise sector by providing
or seeing to the critical inputs necessary for growth and sustainability

219

3.40%

$ 401,283

Individual /Peer-to-Peer
Lenders

* 37 of our funders are unknown types.
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Through Access to Capital, we work to create economic opportunity for
people in emerging markets. By opening new doors to financial services
and property rights, we're helping to foster entrepreneurial behavior,
economic activity, and job creation. Specifically, we focus on
microfinance, small-to-medium enterprise, emerging market ventures,
and property rights

Table 2. MFO Risk Dimensions and Empirical Indicators
MFO Risk
Dimensions

Indicators*
Number of Employees

Description**
Total number of employees of the MFO

Total Assets

Total of all net asset accounts

Number of Offices

Total number of staffed points of service
and administrative sites used to deliver or
support the delivery of financial services to
microfinance clients

Return on Assets

(Net Operating Income, less Taxes) / Assets

Operational Self-Sufficiency

Financial Revenue/(Financial Expense +
Impairment Loss + Operating Expense)

Write-Off Ratio

Write Offs / Gross Loan Portfolio

MIX’s Diamond Score

5-point rating scale to evaluate the quality
and transparency of an MFO’s financial
reporting (5 = highest transparency)

Regulated Dummy

A dummy variable indicating whether an
MFO is regulated by a state banking
supervisory agency

Size

Financial
Performance

Transparency

* All indicators are standardized before the factor analysis
** All descriptions follow the MIX’s definitions
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Key Variables*
Variables
1 Commercial capital
2 Public capital
3 GDP per capita
4 Net ODA (% of GNI)
5 Economic globalization
6 Country distance
7 # of active MFOs
8 # of new MFO founded
9 Industry concentration
10 MFO age
11 Nonprofit
12 Borrowers per loan officer
13 Transparency
14 Political uncertainty
15 Financial uncertainty
16 Size
17 Financial performance
18 Political uncertainty X Size
19 Financial uncertainty X Size
20 Political uncertainty X Financial performance
21 Financial uncertainty X Financial performance

Mean
14.26
8.77
7.30
3.23
53.39
21.91
38.90
1.51
0.73
13.73
0.52
5.64
0.04
38.97
20.40
0.15
0.10
0.62
-1.14
-0.12
-0.27

S.D.
4.48
7.29
0.87
4.95
12.42
27.10
34.23
2.84
0.23
8.90
0.50
0.60
0.09
6.20
7.55
0.97
0.43
9.18
5.43
4.20
3.01

1
1
0.13
0.01
-0.10
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.05
0.03
0.05
-0.20
0.08
0.29
-0.06
-0.13
0.19
0.11
0.06
-0.17
-0.02
0.03

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1
0.06
-0.08
0.01
-0.03
0.14
0.06
0.11
0.10
-0.14
0.11
0.17
0.03
-0.06
0.12
0.03
0.04
-0.04
0.00
0.05

1
-0.53
0.53
0.22
-0.04
-0.11
-0.11
0.09
0.14
-0.08
-0.13
-0.43
-0.08
-0.12
0.05
-0.07
0.14
0.07
0.07

1
-0.05
0.16
-0.39
-0.17
-0.24
-0.15
0.03
-0.17
-0.10
0.14
0.52
-0.08
-0.10
-0.02
-0.01
-0.07
-0.14

1
0.43
-0.30
-0.24
-0.22
0.04
-0.03
-0.30
-0.08
-0.48
0.14
-0.16
0.07
-0.07
0.13
0.05
0.00

1
-0.36
-0.21
-0.22
-0.10
-0.03
-0.21
-0.08
-0.10
0.28
-0.13
0.05
-0.02
0.11
0.01
-0.03

1
0.49
0.53
0.01
-0.16
0.30
0.18
-0.01
-0.52
0.22
0.00
-0.03
-0.22
0.00
0.10

1
0.13
-0.18
-0.13
0.14
0.10
-0.11
-0.31
0.10
0.03
-0.03
-0.09
0.04
-0.02

1
0.11
-0.04
0.21
0.09
0.16
-0.33
0.08
0.03
-0.02
-0.07
-0.04
0.04

1
0.14
0.18
0.13
0.13
0.00
0.16
0.08
0.14
-0.02
0.06
0.07

Variables
11
12
11 Nonprofit
1
12 Borrowers per loan officer
0.05
1
13 Transparency
-0.30
0.13
14 Political uncertainty
0.06
0.19
15 Financial uncertainty
0.07
-0.10
16 Size
-0.08
0.15
17 Financial performance
0.00
0.12
18 Political uncertainty X Size
0.04
0.00
19 Financial uncertainty X Size
0.13
-0.17
20 Political uncertainty X Financial performance
-0.01
-0.01
21 Financial uncertainty X Financial performance -0.06
0.06
*All correlations equal to or greater than 0.05 are significant (p<.05).

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

1
0.09
-0.19
0.76
0.41
0.54
-0.43
-0.11
0.12

1
0.04
0.10
-0.05
0.04
-0.02
-0.09
-0.06

1
-0.14
-0.08
-0.01
-0.05
-0.04
-0.07

1
0.02
0.73
-0.58
0.01
0.04

1
0.01
0.05
-0.33
0.26

1
-0.09
0.05
0.02

1
0.01
-0.01

1
-0.01

1
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Table 4a. Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of MFO Commercial and Public Capital Acquisition
(1)
Commercial
GDP per capita (logged)
Net ODA (% of GNI)
Economic globalization
Country distance
# of active MFOs
# of new MFO founded
Industry concentration
MFO age
Nonprofit
Borrowers per loan officer
Transparency
Political uncertainty
Financial uncertainty
Size
Financial performance

-2.848
(2.980)
0.256+
(0.145)
-0.033
(0.041)
0.025***
(0.005)
0.013
(0.014)
0.128*
(0.051)
-4.953*
(2.329)
0.053***
(0.012)
-0.917***
(0.239)
-0.075
(0.202)
11.190***
(1.464)
-0.052
(0.073)
-0.102*
(0.040)

Public
-0.754
(4.940)
0.400+
(0.240)
-0.383***
(0.068)
-0.006
(0.008)
-0.099***
(0.023)
-0.057
(0.085)
-5.788
(3.862)
0.101***
(0.020)
-1.825***
(0.396)
0.549
(0.335)
10.365***
(2.427)
-0.084
(0.120)
0.032
(0.066)

(2)
Commercial
-2.953
(2.971)
0.278+
(0.145)
-0.038
(0.041)
0.024***
(0.005)
0.012
(0.014)
0.142**
(0.052)
-4.994*
(2.320)
0.049***
(0.012)
-1.443***
(0.276)
-0.144
(0.210)
1.971
(2.791)
-0.038
(0.072)
-0.093*
(0.040)
0.851***
(0.213)
0.668*
(0.392)

(3)
Commercial

Public
-0.164
(4.938)
0.411+
(0.240)
-0.389***
(0.068)
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.097***
(0.023)
-0.024
(0.086)
-5.655
(3.856)
0.100***
(0.020)
-1.531***
(0.459)
0.816*
(0.349)
14.448**
(4.639)
-0.098
(0.120)
0.025
(0.066)
-0.156
(0.354)
-1.646*
(0.651)

Political uncertainty X Size
Financial uncertainty X Size

-3.910
(2.941)
0.220
(0.143)
-0.046
(0.041)
0.023***
(0.005)
0.015
(0.014)
0.107*
(0.052)
-4.715*
(2.294)
0.047***
(0.012)
-1.404***
(0.273)
-0.089
(0.208)
1.456
(2.760)
-0.022
(0.072)
-0.101**
(0.039)
1.149***
(0.216)
0.628
(0.387)
0.313***
(0.049)

Public
-0.616
(4.942)
0.384
(0.241)
-0.393***
(0.068)
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.096***
(0.023)
-0.040
(0.087)
-5.523
(3.854)
0.099***
(0.020)
-1.513***
(0.458)
0.842*
(0.349)
14.204**
(4.638)
-0.090
(0.120)
0.021
(0.066)
-0.016
(0.363)
-1.665*
(0.651)
0.148*
(0.083)

(4)
Commercial
-1.621
(2.924)
0.187
(0.143)
-0.050
(0.040)
0.023***
(0.005)
0.026+
(0.014)
0.096+
(0.051)
-5.167*
(2.279)
0.038**
(0.012)
-1.371***
(0.271)
-0.116
(0.207)
0.757
(2.747)
-0.040
(0.071)
-0.034
(0.040)
3.481***
(0.396)
0.446
(0.386)

0.678
(4.935)
0.354
(0.241)
-0.397***
(0.068)
-0.006
(0.008)
-0.088***
(0.024)
-0.053
(0.087)
-5.764
(3.848)
0.093***
(0.020)
-1.486**
(0.458)
0.834*
(0.349)
13.681**
(4.636)
-0.099
(0.120)
0.062
(0.067)
1.505*
(0.668)
-1.786**
(0.651)

0.319***
(0.041)

N
1746
1746
1746
1746
1746
1746
1746
R squared
0.388
0.328
0.394
0.331
0.408
0.332
0.416
Wald test (Degrees of freedom)
7.96*** (2) 3.46* (2)
40.03*** (1) 3.17* (1)
61.36*** (1)
All models included country- and year-fixed effects.
Significance levels: + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001. One-tailed test for hypothesized variables and two-tailed test for controls.
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Public

(5)
Commercial

Public

0.202**
(0.069)

-2.543
(2.910)
0.153
(0.142)
-0.054
(0.040)
0.022***
(0.005)
0.026+
(0.014)
0.075
(0.051)
-4.925*
(2.264)
0.038**
(0.012)
-1.349***
(0.269)
-0.076
(0.205)
0.507
(2.728)
-0.028
(0.071)
-0.048
(0.039)
3.381***
(0.394)
0.443
(0.383)
0.246***
(0.050)
0.279***
(0.041)

0.289
(4.945)
0.340
(0.241)
-0.399***
(0.068)
-0.006
(0.008)
-0.088***
(0.024)
-0.062
(0.087)
-5.662
(3.848)
0.092***
(0.020)
-1.477**
(0.458)
0.851*
(0.349)
13.575**
(4.636)
-0.094
(0.120)
0.056
(0.067)
1.463*
(0.669)
-1.787**
(0.651)
0.104
(0.085)
0.185**
(0.070)

1746
0.334
8.60** (1)

1746
0.424
43.31*** (2)

1746
0.335
5.05** (2)

Table 4b. Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of MFO Commercial and Public Capital Acquisition
(6)
Commercial
GDP per capita (logged)
Net ODA (% of GNI)
Economic globalization
Country distance
# of active MFOs
# of new MFO founded
Industry concentration
MFO age
Nonprofit
Borrowers per loan officer
Transparency
Political uncertainty
Financial uncertainty
Size
Financial performance
Political uncertainty X Financial performance
Financial uncertainty X Financial performance

-2.820
(2.965)
0.280+
(0.144)
-0.034
(0.041)
0.024***
(0.005)
0.010
(0.014)
0.170**
(0.053)
-5.311*
(2.318)
0.050***
(0.012)
-1.432***
(0.275)
-0.124
(0.210)
1.725
(2.786)
0.003
(0.074)
-0.086*
(0.039)
0.880***
(0.213)
0.572
(0.392)
-0.175**
(0.060)

Public
-0.109
(4.939)
0.412+
(0.240)
-0.387***
(0.068)
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.097***
(0.023)
-0.012
(0.088)
-5.786
(3.861)
0.100***
(0.020)
-1.527***
(0.459)
0.825*
(0.350)
14.346**
(4.642)
-0.081
(0.123)
0.027
(0.066)
-0.145
(0.355)
-1.686**
(0.654)
-0.072
(0.100)

(7)
Commercial

Public

-3.057
(2.972)
0.270+
(0.145)
-0.037
(0.041)
0.024***
(0.005)
0.013
(0.014)
0.158**
(0.053)
-4.949*
(2.320)
0.050***
(0.012)
-1.460***
(0.276)
-0.133
(0.210)
1.942
(2.791)
-0.033
(0.073)
-0.095*
(0.040)
0.857***
(0.213)
0.561
(0.400)

-0.211
(4.941)
0.408+
(0.241)
-0.389***
(0.068)
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.096***
(0.023)
-0.016
(0.089)
-5.635
(3.858)
0.100***
(0.020)
-1.539***
(0.459)
0.821*
(0.350)
14.435**
(4.641)
-0.095
(0.121)
0.024
(0.066)
-0.154
(0.355)
-1.694*
(0.666)

0.054
(0.042)
1746
0.395
1.67 (1)

0.024
(0.069)
1746
0.331
0.12 (1)

(8)
Commercial
-2.934
(2.965)
0.271+
(0.144)
-0.033
(0.041)
0.024***
(0.005)
0.012
(0.014)
0.189***
(0.054)
-5.270*
(2.317)
0.051***
(0.012)
-1.451***
(0.276)
-0.110
(0.210)
1.683
(2.786)
0.010
(0.074)
-0.089*
(0.040)
0.887***
(0.213)
0.446
(0.401)
-0.180**
(0.060)
0.062
(0.042)
1746
0.398
5.30** (2)

Public
-0.160
(4.942)
0.409+
(0.241)
-0.387***
(0.068)
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.097***
(0.024)
-0.004
(0.090)
-5.767
(3.862)
0.100***
(0.020)
-1.535***
(0.459)
0.831*
(0.350)
14.327**
(4.644)
-0.078
(0.123)
0.026
(0.066)
-0.141
(0.355)
-1.742**
(0.669)
-0.075
(0.101)
0.028
(0.070)
1746
0.331
0.34 (2)

N
1746
1746
R squared
0.397
0.331
Wald test (Degrees of freedom)
8.39** (1)
0.52 (1)
All models included country- and year-fixed effects.
Significance levels: + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001. One-tailed test for hypothesized variables and two-tailed test for controls.
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Table 5. The Relationship between MFO Size and Social Outreach

Size
N
Log likelihood

Average
loan size

Proportion of
women
borrowers

0.100***
(0.012)
10893
-6449.854

-0.004+
(0.003)
9319
9052.774

Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
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Figure 1. Plots of Significant Interactions between Political/Financial Uncertainty and MFO Size
12

18
16

10
8

Political
uncertainty
(min)

6

Political
uncertainty
(max)

4

12

Public Capital

Commercial Capital

14

Political
uncertainty
(min)

10
8

Political
uncertainty
(max)

6
4

2

2
0

0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0

0.1

Size

0.2

0.3

0.4

Size

14

25

12

Financial
uncertainty
(min)

8
6

Financial
uncertainty
(max)

4

Public Capital

Commercial Capital

20
10

Financial
uncertainty
(min)

15

Financial
uncertainty
(max)

10

5

2
0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0

0.4

0

Size

0.1

0.2

Size

48

0.3

0.4

Figure 2. Plot of Significant Interaction between Political Uncertainty and Financial Performance
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